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█ Abstract In his book Free Will Sam Harris tries to persuade us to abandon the morally pernicious idea 
of free will. The following contribution articulates and defends a more sophisticated model of free will 
that is not only consistent with neuroscience and introspection but also grounds a variety of responsibility 
that justifies both praise and blame, reward and punishment. This begins with the long lasting parting of 
opinion between compatibilists (who argue that free will can live comfortably with determinism) and in-
compatibilists (who deny this). While Harris dismisses compatibilism as a form of theology, this article 
aims at showing that Harris has underestimated and misinterpreted compatibilism and at defending a 
more sophisticated version of compatibilism that is impervious to Harris’ criticism. 
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█ Riassunto Riflessioni su “Free Will” di Sam Harris – Nel suo volume Free Will Sam Harris cerca di persua-
derci ad abbandonare l’idea, a suo avviso moralmente perniciosa, del libero arbitrio. Il contributo seguente 
articola e difende un modello di libero arbitrio che non solo è coerente con le neuroscienze e con 
l’introspezione, ma che dà anche fondamento a varie forme di responsabilità, giustificando encomio, biasi-
mo, premi e punizioni. Ilpunto di partenza è la lunga disputa, di vecchia data, fra compatibilisti (secondo i 
quali il libero arbitrio può convivere pacificamente con il determinismo) e incompatibilisti (che negano que-
sta posizione). Mentre Harris respinge il compatibilismo considerandolo una forma di teologia, questo arti-
colo intende mostrare come Harris abbia sottostimato e male interpretato il compatibilismo e come invece 
sia possibile enucleare una forma di compatibilismo più sofisticata, insensibile alle sue critiche. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Sam Harris; Libero arbitrio; Compatibilismo; Incompatibilismo; Neuroscienza 
 

SAM HARRIS’S FREE WILL1 is a remarkable 
little book, engagingly written and jargon – 
free, appealing to reason, not authority, and 
written with passion and moral seriousness. 
This is not an ivory tower technical inquiry; 
it is in effect a political tract, designed to per-
suade us all to abandon what he considers to 
be a morally pernicious idea: the idea of free 
will. If you are one of the many who have 
been brainwashed into believing that you 
have – or rather, are – an (immortal, imma-
terial) soul who makes all your decisions in-
dependently of the causes impinging on your 
material body and especially your brain, then 
this is the book for you. Or, if you have dis-
missed dualism but think that what you are is 
a conscious (but material) ego, a witness that 
inhabits a nook in your brain and chooses, 
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independently of external causation, all your 
voluntary acts, again, this book is for you. It 
is a fine “antidote,” as Paul Bloom says, to 
this incoherent and socially malignant illu-
sion. The incoherence of the illusion has 
been demonstrated time and again in rather 
technical work by philosophers (in spite of 
still finding supporters in the profession), but 
Harris does a fine job of making this appar-
ently unpalatable fact accessible to lay peo-
ple. Its malignance is due to its fostering the 
idea of Absolute Responsibility, with its at-
tendant implications of what we might call 
Guilt-in-the-eyes-of-God for the unfortunate 
sinners amongst us and, for the fortunate, the 
arrogant and self-deluded idea of Ultimate 
Authorship of the good we do. We take too 
much blame, and too much credit, Harris ar-
gues. We, and the rest of the world, would be 
a lot better off if we took ourselves – our 
selves – less seriously. We don’t have the 
kind of free will that would ground such Ab-
solute Responsibility for either the harm or 
the good we cause in our lives. 
All this is laudable and right, and vividly 
presented, and Harris does a particularly 
good job getting readers to introspect on 
their own decision‐making and notice that it 
just does not conform to the fantasies of this 
all too traditional understanding of how we 
think and act. But some of us have long rec-
ognized these points and gone on to adopt 
more reasonable, more empirically sound, 
models of decision and thought, and we 
think we can articulate and defend a more 
sophisticated model of free will that is not 
only consistent with neuroscience and intro-
spection but also grounds a (modified, toned-
down, non-Absolute) variety of responsibility 
that justifies both praise and blame, reward 
and punishment. We don’t think this variety 
of free will is an illusion at all, but rather a 
robust feature of our psychology and a relia-
ble part of the foundations of morality, law 
and society. Harris, we think, is throwing out 
the baby with the bathwater. 
He is not alone among scientists in com-
ing to the conclusion that the ancient idea of 
free will is not just confused but also a major 
obstacle to social reform. His brief essay is, 
however, the most sustained attempt to de-
velop this theme, which can also be found in 
remarks and essays by such heavyweight sci-
entists as the neuroscientists Wolf Singer and 
Chris Frith, the psychologists Steven Pinker 
and Paul Bloom, the physicists Stephen 
Hawking and Albert Einstein, and the evolu-
tionary biologists Jerry Coyne and (when he’s 
not thinking carefully) Richard Dawkins.  
The book is, thus, valuable as a compact 
and compelling expression of an opinion 
widely shared by eminent scientists these days. 
It is also valuable, as I will show, as a veritable 
museum of mistakes, none of them new and 
all of them seductive – alluring enough to lull 
the critical faculties of this host of brilliant 
thinkers who do not make a profession of 
thinking about free will. And, to be sure, these 
mistakes have also been made, sometimes for 
centuries, by philosophers themselves. But I 
think we have made some progress in philoso-
phy of late, and Harris and others need to do 
their homework if they want to engage with 
the best thought on the topic.  
I am not being disingenuous when I say this 
museum of mistakes is valuable; I am grateful 
to Harris for saying, so boldly and clearly, what 
less outgoing scientists are thinking but keeping 
to themselves. I have always suspected that 
many who hold this hard determinist view are 
making these mistakes, but we mustn’t put 
words in people’s mouths, and now Harris has 
done us a great service by articulating the 
points explicitly, and the chorus of approval 
he has received from scientists goes a long way 
to confirming that they have been making 
these mistakes all along. Wolfgang Pauli’s fa-
mous dismissal of another physicist’s work as 
“not even wrong” reminds us of the value of 
crystallizing an ambient cloud of hunches into 
something that can be shown to be wrong. 
Correcting widespread misunderstanding is 
usually the work of many hands, and Harris 
has made a significant contribution. 
The first parting of opinion on free will is 
between compatibilists and incompatibilists. 
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The latter say (with “common sense” and a 
tradition going back more than two millen-
nia) that free will is incompatible with deter-
minism, the scientific thesis that there are 
causes for everything that happens. Incom-
patibilists hold that unless there are “random 
swerves”2 that disrupt the iron chains of 
physical causation, none of our decisions or 
choices can be truly free. Being caused means 
not being free – what could be more obvious? 
The compatibilists deny this; they have ar-
gued, for centuries if not millennia, that once 
you understand what free will really is (and 
must be, to sustain our sense of moral respon-
sibility), you will see that free will can live 
comfortably with determinism – if determin-
ism is what science eventually settles on. 
Incompatibilists thus tend to pin their 
hopes on indeterminism, and hence were much 
cheered by the emergence of quantum inde-
terminism in 20th century physics. Perhaps the 
brain can avail itself of undetermined quantum 
swerves at the sub-atomic level, and thus es-
cape the shackles of physical law! Or perhaps 
there is some other way our choices could be 
truly undetermined. Some have gone so far as 
to posit an otherwise unknown (and almost en-
tirely unanalyzable) phenomenon called agent 
causation, in which free choices are caused 
somehow by an agent, but not by any event in 
the agent’s history. One exponent of this posi-
tion, Roderick Chisholm, candidly acknowl-
edged that on this view every free choice is “a 
little miracle” – which makes it clear enough 
why this is a school of thought endorsed pri-
marily by deeply religious philosophers and 
shunned by almost everyone else. 
Incompatibilists who think we have free 
will, and therefore determinism must be false, 
are known as libertarians (which has nothing 
to do with the political view of the same 
name). Incompatibilists who think that all 
human choices are determined by prior events 
in their brains (which were themselves no 
doubt determined by chains of events arising 
out of the distant past) conclude from this 
that we can’t have free will, and, hence, are not 
responsible for our actions.  
This concern for varieties of indetermin-
ism is misplaced, argue the compatibilists: 
free will is a phenomenon that requires nei-
ther determinism nor indeterminism; the so-
lution to the problem of free will lies in real-
izing this, not banking on the quantum phys-
icists to come through with the right physics 
– or a miracle. Compatibilism may seem in-
credible on its face, or desperately contrived, 
some kind of a trick with words, but not to 
philosophers. Compatibilism is the reigning 
view among philosophers (just over 59%, ac-
cording to the 2009 Philpapers survey) with 
libertarians coming second with 13% and 
hard determinists only 12%. It is striking, 
then, that all the scientists just cited have 
landed on the position rejected by almost 
nine out of ten philosophers, but not so sur-
prising when one considers that these scien-
tists hardly ever consider the compatibilist 
view or the reasons in its favor. 
Harris has considered compatibilism, at 
least cursorily, and his opinion of it is breath-
takingly dismissive: After acknowledging 
that it is the prevailing view among philoso-
phers (including his friend Daniel Dennett), 
he asserts that «more than in any other area 
of academic philosophy, the result resembles 
theology». This is a low blow, and worse fol-
lows: «from both a moral and a scientific 
perspective, this seems deliberately obtuse».3 
I would hope that Harris would pause at this 
point to wonder – just wonder – whether 
maybe his philosophical colleagues had seen 
some points that had somehow escaped him 
in his canvassing of compatibilism. As I tell 
my undergraduate students, whenever they 
encounter in their required reading a claim or 
argument that seems just plain stupid, they 
should probably double check to make sure 
they are not misreading the “preposterous” 
passage in question. It is possible that they 
have uncovered a howling error that has 
somehow gone unnoticed by the profession 
for generations, but not very likely. In this in-
stance, the chances that Harris has underesti-
mated and misinterpreted compatibilism 
seem particularly good, since the points he de-
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fends later in the book agree right down the 
line with compatibilism; he himself is a com-
patibilist in everything but name! 
Seriously, his main objection to compati-
bilism, issued several times, is that what com-
patibilists mean by “free will” is not what eve-
ryday folk mean by “free will”. Everyday folk 
mean something demonstrably preposterous, 
but Harris sees the effort by compatibilists to 
make the folks’ hopeless concept of free will 
presentable as somehow disingenuous, unmo-
tivated spin-doctoring, not the project of 
sympathetic reconstruction the compatibilists 
take themselves to be engaged in. So it all 
comes down to who gets to decide how to use 
the term “free will.” Harris is a compatibilist 
about moral responsibility and the importance 
of the distinction between voluntary and in-
voluntary actions, but he is not a compatibilist 
about free will since he thinks “free will” has 
to be given the incoherent sense that emerges 
from uncritical reflection by everyday folk. He 
sees quite well that compatibilism is «the only 
philosophically respectable way to endorse 
free will»,4 but adds: «however, the “free will” 
that compatibilists defend is not the free will 
that most people feel they have».5 
First of all, he doesn’t know this. This is a 
guess, and suitably expressed questionnaires 
might well prove him wrong. That is an em-
pirical question, and a thoughtful pioneering 
attempt to answer it suggests that Harris’s 
guess is simply mistaken.6 The newly emerg-
ing field of experimental philosophy (or “X-
phi”) has a rather unprepossessing track rec-
ord to date, but these are early days, and some 
of the work has yielded interesting results that 
certainly defy complacent assumptions com-
mon among philosophers. The study by 
Nahmias and colleagues in 2005 found sub-
stantial majorities (between 60 and 80%) in 
agreement with propositions that are compat-
ibilist in outlook, not incompatibilist. 
Harris’s claim that the folk are mostly in-
compatibilists is thus dubious on its face, and 
even if it is true, maybe all this shows is that 
most people are suffering from a sort of illusion 
that could be replaced by wisdom. After all, 
most people used to believe the sun went 
around the earth. They were wrong, and it took 
some heavy lifting to convince them of this. 
Maybe this factoid is a reflection on how much 
work science and philosophy still have to do to 
give everyday laypeople a sound concept of free 
will. We’ve not yet succeeded in getting them 
to see the difference between weight and mass, 
and Einsteinian relativity still eludes most peo-
ple. When we found out that the sun does not 
revolve around the earth, we didn’t then insist 
that there is no such thing as the sun (because 
what the folk mean by “sun” is “that bright 
thing that goes around the earth”). Now that 
we understand what sunsets are, we don’t call 
them illusions. They are real phenomena that 
can mislead the naïve. 
To see the context in which Harris’s criti-
cism plays out, consider a parallel. The folk 
concept of mind is a shambles, for sure: dualis-
tic, scientifically misinformed and replete with 
miraculous features – even before we get to 
ESP and psychokinesis and poltergeists. So 
when social scientists talk about beliefs or de-
sires and cognitive neuroscientists talk about 
attention and memory they are deliberately us-
ing cleaned‐up, demystified substitutes for the 
folk concepts. Is this theology, is this deliber-
ately obtuse, countenancing the use of con-
cepts with such disreputable ancestors? I think 
not, but the case can be made (there are mad-
dog reductionist neuroscientists and philoso-
phers who insist that minds are illusions, pains 
are illusions, dreams are illusions, ideas are il-
lusions – all there is is just neurons and glia 
and the like). The same could be said about 
color, for example. What everyday folk think 
colors are – if you pushed them beyond their 
everyday contexts in the paint store and pick-
ing out their clothes – is hugely deluded; that 
doesn’t mean that colors are an illusion. They 
are real in spite of the fact that, for instance, 
atoms aren’t colored. 
Here are some more instances of Harris’s 
move: «We do not have the freedom we think 
we have».7 Who’s we? Maybe many people, 
maybe most, think that they have a kind of 
freedom that they don’t and can’t have. But 
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that settles nothing. There may be other, bet-
ter kinds of freedom that people also think 
they have, and that are worth wanting.8  
 
We do not know what we intend to do until 
the intention itself arises. [True, but so 
what?] To understand this is to realize that 
we are not the authors of our thoughts and 
actions in the way that people generally sup-
pose.9  
   
Again, so what? Maybe we are authors of 
our thoughts and actions in a slightly differ-
ent way. Harris doesn’t even consider that 
possibility (since that would require taking 
compatibilist “theology” seriously). 
 
If determinism is true, the future is set – 
and this includes all our future states of 
mind and our subsequent behavior. And 
to the extent that the law of cause and ef-
fect is subject to indeterminism – quan-
tum or otherwise – we can take no credit 
for what happens. There is no combina-
tion of these truths that seem compatible 
with the popular notion of free will.10  
 
Again, the popular notion of free will is a 
mess; we knew that long before Harris sat 
down to write his book. He needs to go after 
the attempted improvements, and it cannot 
be part of his criticism that they are not the 
popular notion. There is also another problem 
with this paragraph. The sentence about in-
determinism is false:  
 
And to the extent that the law of cause and 
effect is subject to indeterminism – quan-
tum or otherwise – we can take no credit 
for what happens.11  
 
Here is a counterexample, contrived, but 
highlighting the way indeterminism could 
infect our actions and still leave us responsi-
ble (a variant of an old – 1978 – counterex-
ample of mine): 
 
You must correctly answer three questions 
to save the world from a space pirate, who 
provides you with a special answering gadg-
et. It has two buttons marked YES and NO 
and two foot pedals marked YES and NO. 
A sign on the gadget lights up after every 
question “Use the buttons” or “Use the ped-
als.” You are asked “is Chicago the capital of 
Illinois?”, the sign says “Use the buttons” 
and you press the No button with your fin-
ger. Then you are asked “Are Dugongs 
mammals?”, the sign says “Use the buttons” 
and you press the Yes button with your fin-
ger. Finally you are asked “Are proteins 
made of amino acids?” and the sign says 
“Use the pedals” so you reach out with your 
foot and press the Yes pedal. A roar of grati-
tude goes up from the crowd. You’ve saved 
the world, thanks to your knowledge and 
responsible action! But all three actions 
were unpredictable by Laplace’s demon be-
cause whether the light said “Button” or 
“Pedals” was caused by a quantum random 
event. In a less obvious way, random per-
turbations could infect (without negating) 
your every deed. The tone of your voice 
when you give your evidence could be 
tweaked up or done, the pressure of your 
trigger finger as you pull the trigger could be 
tweaked greater or lesser, and so forth, 
without robbing you of responsibility. 
Brains are, in all likelihood, designed by 
natural selection to absorb random fluctua-
tions without being seriously diverted by 
them – just as computers are. But that 
means that randomness need not destroy 
the rationality, the well‐governedness, the 
sense‐making integrity of your control sys-
tem. Your brain may even exploit random-
ness in a variety of ways to enhance its heu-
ristic search for good solutions to problems. 
 
These are not new ideas. For instance I have 
defended them explicitly in 1978, 1984, and 
2003.12 I wish Harris had noticed that he con-
tradicts them here, and I’m curious to learn 
how he proposes to counter my arguments.  
Another mistake he falls for – in very good 
company – is the mistake the great J.L. Austin 
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makes in his notorious footnote about his 
missed putt. First Austin’s version, and my 
analysis of the error, and then Harris’s version. 
 
Consider the case where I miss a very short 
putt and kick myself because I could have 
holed it. It is not that I should have holed it 
if I had tried: I did try, and missed. It is not 
that I should have holed it if conditions had 
been different: that might of course be so, 
but I am talking about conditions as they pre-
cisely were, and asserting that I could have 
holed it. There is the rub. Nor does “I can 
hole it this time” mean that I shall hole it 
this time if I try or if anything else; for I may 
try and miss, and yet not be convinced that 
I could not have done it; indeed, further ex-
periments may confirm my belief that I could 
have done it that time, although I did not.13  
  
Austin claims to be talking about condi-
tions as they precisely were, but if so, then 
further experiments could not confirm his 
belief. Presumably he has in mind something 
like this: he could line up ten “identical” 
putts on the same green and, say, sink nine 
out of ten. This would show, would it not, 
that he could have made that putt? Yes, to 
the satisfaction of almost everybody, but No, 
if he means under conditions “as they pre-
cisely were,” for conditions were subtly dif-
ferent in every subsequent putt – the sun a 
little lower in the sky, the green a little drier 
or moister, the temperature or wind direc-
tion ever so slightly different, Austin himself 
older and maybe wiser, or maybe more tired, 
or maybe more relaxed. This variation is not 
a bug to be eliminated from such experi-
ments, but a feature without which experi-
ments could not show that Austin “could 
have done otherwise,” and this is precisely 
the elbow room we need to see that “could 
have done otherwise” is perfectly compatible 
with determinism, because it never means, in 
real life, what philosophers have imagined it 
means: replay exactly the same “tape” and get 
a different result. Not only can such an ex-
periment never be done; if it could, it 
wouldnt’ show what needed showing: some-
thing about Austin’s ability as a golfer, which, 
like all abilities, needs to be demonstrated to 
be robust under variation. 
Here is Harris’ version of the same mistake: 
 
To say that they were free not to rape and 
murder is to say that they could have resist-
ed the impulse to do so (or could have 
avoided feeling such an impulse altogether) 
– with the universe, including their brains, 
in precisely the same state it was in at the 
moment they committed their crimes.14 
 
Just not true. If we are interested in wheth-
er somebody has free will, it is some kind of 
ability that we want to assess, and you can’t 
assess any ability by “replaying the tape”.15  
This is as true of the abilities of automo-
biles as of people. Suppose I am driving along 
at 60 MPH and am asked if my car can also 
go 80 MPH. Yes, I reply, but not in precisely 
the same conditions; I have to press harder 
on the accelerator. In fact, I add, it can also 
go 40 MPH, but not with conditions precisely 
as they are. Replay the tape till eternity, and 
it will never go 40MPH in just these condi-
tions. So if you want to know whether some 
rapist/murderer was “free not to rape and 
murder,” don’t distract yourself with fanta-
sies about determinism and rewinding the 
tape; rely on the sorts of observations and 
tests that everyday folk use to confirm and 
disconfirm their verdicts about who could 
have done otherwise and who couldn’t.16  
One of the effects of Harris’s misconstruing 
compatibilism is that when he turns to the task 
of avoiding the dire conclusions of the hard de-
terminists, he underestimates his task.17 At the 
end of the book, he gets briefly concessive, 
throwing a few scraps to the opposition:  
 
And it is wise to hold people responsible 
for their actions when doing so influences 
their behavior and brings benefit to socie-
ty. But this does not mean that we must be 
taken in by the illusion of free will. We 
need only acknowledge that efforts matter 
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and that people can change. We do not 
change ourselves, precisely – because we 
have only ourselves with which to do the 
changing – but we continually influence, 
and are influenced by, the world around us 
and the world within us. It may seem para-
doxical to hold people responsible for what 
happens in their corner of the universe, but 
once we break the spell of free will, we can 
do this precisely to the degree that it is use-
ful. Where people can change, we can de-
mand that they do so. Where change is 
impossible, or unresponsive to demands, 
we can chart some other course.18 
  
Harris should take more seriously the var-
ious tensions he sets up in this passage. It is 
wise to hold people responsible, he says, even 
though they are not responsible, not really. 
But we don’t hold everybody responsible; as 
he notes, we excuse those who are unrespon-
sive to demands, or in whom change is im-
possible. That’s an important difference, and 
it is based on the different abilities or compe-
tences that people have. Some people (are de-
termined to) have the abilities that justify our 
holding them responsible, and some people 
(are determined to) lack those abilities. But 
determinism doesn’t do any work here; in 
particular it doesn’t disqualify those we hold 
responsible from occupying that role. In oth-
er words, real responsibility, the kind the eve-
ryday folk think they have (if Harris is right), 
is strictly impossible; but when those same 
folk wisely and justifiably hold somebody re-
sponsible, that isn’t real responsibility!19  
And what is Harris saying about whether 
we can change ourselves? He says we can’t 
change ourselves “precisely” but we can in-
fluence (and hence change) others, and they 
can change us. But then why can’t we change 
ourselves by getting help from others to 
change us? Why, for that matter, can’t we do 
to ourselves what we do to those others, re-
minding ourselves, admonishing ourselves, 
reasoning with ourselves? It does work, not 
always but enough to make to worth trying. 
And notice: if we do things to influence and 
change others, and thereby turn them into 
something bad – encouraging their racist or 
violent tendencies, for instance, or inciting 
them to commit embezzlement, we may be 
held responsible for this socially malign ac-
tion. (Think of the drunk driving laws that 
now hold the bartender or the party host 
partly responsible for the damage done.) But 
then by the same reasoning we can justifiably 
be held responsible for influencing ourselves, 
for good or ill. We can take some credit for 
any improvements we achieve in others – or 
ourselves – and we can share the blame for 
any damage we do to others or ourselves.  
There are complications with all this, but 
Harris doesn’t even look at the surface of 
these issues. For instance, our capacities to in-
fluence ourselves are themselves only partly the 
result of earlier efforts at self‐improvement in 
which we ourselves played a major role. It 
takes a village to raise a child, as Hilary Clin-
ton has observed. In the end, if we trace back 
far enough to our infancy or beyond, we ar-
rive at conditions that we were just lucky (or 
unlucky) to be born with. This undeniable 
fact is not the disqualifier of responsibility 
that Harris and others assume. It disqualifies 
us for “Ultimate” responsibility, which would 
require us to be – like God! – causa sui, the 
original cause of ourselves, as Galen Straw-
son has observed, but this is nonsense. Our 
lack of Ultimate responsibility is not a moral 
blemish; if the discovery of this lack moti-
vates some to reform our policies of reward 
and punishment, that is a good result, but it 
is hardly compelled by reason. 
This emerging idea, that we can justifi-
ably be held to be the authors (if not the Au-
thors) of not only our deeds but the character 
from which our deeds flow, undercuts much 
of the rhetoric in Harris’s book. Harris is the 
author of his book; he is responsible for both 
its virtues, for which he deserves thanks, and 
its vices, for which he may justifiably be criti-
cized. But then why can we not generalize 
this point to Harris himself, and rightly hold 
him at least partly responsible for his charac-
ter since it too is a product – with help from 
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others, of course – of his earlier efforts? Sup-
pose he replied that he is not really the au-
thor of Free Will. At what point do we get to 
use Harris’s criticism against his own claims? 
Harris might claim that he is not really re-
sponsible, isn’t really the author of his own 
book, isn’t really responsible, but that isn’t 
what the folk would say. The folk believe in a 
kind of responsibility that is exemplified by 
Harris’s authorship. Harris would have dis-
torted the folk notion of responsibility as 
much if not more than compatibilists have 
distorted the folk notion of free will. 
Harris opens his book with an example of 
murderous psychopaths, Hayes and Komisar-
jevsky, who commit unspeakable atrocities. 
One has shown remorse, the other reports 
having been abused as a child. 
 
Whatever their conscious motives, these 
men cannot know why they are as they 
are. Nor can we account for why we are 
not like them.20  
 
Really? I think we can. The sentence is am-
biguous, in fact. Harris knows full well that we 
can provide detailed and empirically supported 
accounts of why normal, law‐abiding people 
who would never commit those atrocities 
emerge by the millions from all sorts of back-
grounds, and why these psychopaths are differ-
ent. But he has a different question in mind: 
why we – you and I – are in the fortunate, 
normal class instead of having been doomed to 
psychopathy. A different issue, but also an ir-
relevant, merely metaphysical issue. (Cf. “Why 
was I born in the 20th century, and not during 
the Renaissance? We’ll never know!”). 
The rhetorical move here is well‐known, 
but indefensible. If you’re going to raise these 
horrific cases, it behooves you to consider 
that they might be cases of pathology, as 
measured against (moral) health. Lumping 
the morally competent with the morally in-
competent and then saying “there really is no 
difference between them, is there?” is a move 
that needs support, not something that can 
be done by assumption or innuendo. 
«I cannot take credit for the fact that I 
don’t have the soul of a psychopath».21 True 
– and false. Harris can’t take credit for the 
luck of his birth, his having had a normal 
moral education – that’s just luck – but those 
born thus lucky are informed that they have 
a duty or obligation to preserve their compe-
tence, and grow it, and educate themselves, 
and Harris has responded admirably to those 
incentives. He can take credit, not Ultimate 
credit, whatever that might be, but partial 
credit, for husbanding the resources he was 
endowed with. As he says, he is just lucky not 
to have been born with Komisarjevsky’s 
genes and life experiences. If he had been, 
he’d have been Komisarjevsky!  
A similar difficulty infects his claim that 
there is no difference between an act caused 
by a brain tumor and an act caused by a belief 
(which is just another brain state, after all).  
   
But a neurological disorder appears to be 
just a special case of physical events giving 
rise to thoughts and actions. Understand-
ing the neurophysiology of the brain, 
therefore, would seem to be as exculpatory 
as finding a tumor in it.22  
 
Notice the use of “appears” and “seem” 
here. Replace them both with “is” and ask if 
he’s made the case. In addition to the “sure-
ly”‐alarm I recommend all readers install in 
their brains (2013), a “seems”-alarm will pick 
up lots of these slippery places where philoso-
phers defer argument where argument is called 
for. Even the simplest and most straightfor-
ward of Harris’s examples wilt under careful 
scrutiny: 
 
Did I consciously choose coffee over tea? 
No. The choice was made for me by 
events in my brain that I, as the conscious 
witness of my thoughts and actions, could 
not inspect or influence.23  
 
Not so. He can influence those internal, un-
conscious actions – by reminding himself, etc. 
He just can’t influence them at the moment they 
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are having their effect on his choice. He also can’t 
influence the unconscious machinery that de-
termines whether he returns a tennis serve with 
a lob or a hard backhand once the serve is on its 
way, but that doesn’t mean his tennis strokes 
are involuntary or outside his – indirect – con-
trol. At one point he says  
 
If you don’t know what your soul is going 
to do, you are not in control.24  
 
Really? When you drive a car, are you not in 
control? You know “your soul” is going to do 
the right thing, whatever in the instant it turns 
out to be, and that suffices to demonstrate to 
you, and the rest of us, that you are in control. 
Control doesn’t get any more real than that. 
Harris ignores the reflexive, repetitive na-
ture of thinking. My choice at time t can influ-
ence my choice at time t’ which can influence 
my choice at time t”. How? My choice at t can 
have among its effects the biasing of settings 
in my brain (which I cannot directly inspect) 
that determine (I use the term deliberately) 
my choice at t’. I can influence my choice at t’. 
I influenced it at time t (without “inspecting” 
it). Like many before him, Harris shrinks the 
me to a dimensionless point, “the witness” 
who is stuck in the Cartesian Theater awaiting 
the decisions made elsewhere. That is simply a 
bad theory of consciousness.  
 
I, as the conscious witness of my experience, 
no more initiate events in my prefrontal 
cortex than I cause my heart to beat.25  
 
If this isn’t pure Cartesianism, I don’t 
know what it is. His prefrontal cortex is part 
of the I in question. Notice that if we replace 
the “conscious witness” with “my brain” we 
turn an apparent truth into an obvious false-
hood: 
 
My brain can no more initiate events in my 
prefrontal cortex than it can cause my 
heart to beat.26 
 
There are more passages that exhibit this 
curious tactic of heaping scorn on daft doc-
trines of his own devising while ignoring rea-
sonable compatibilist versions of the same ide-
as, but I’ve given enough illustrations, and the 
rest are readily identifiable once you see the 
pattern. Harris clearly thinks incompatibilism 
is not worth his attention (so “deliberately ob-
tuse” is it), but after such an indictment, he bet-
ter come up with some impressive criticisms. 
His main case against compatibilism – aside 
from the points above that I have already criti-
cized – consists of three rhetorical questions 
lined up in a row.27 Each one collapses on closer 
inspection. As I point out in Intuition Pumps 
and Other Tools for Thinking, rhetorical ques-
tions, which are stand‐ins for reductio ad ab-
surdum arguments so obvious that they need 
not be spelled out, should always been scruti-
nized as likely weak spots in arguments. I offer 
Harris’s trio as exhibits A, B, and C: 
   
(A) You want to finish your work, but you 
are also inclined to stop working so that you 
can play with your kids. You aspire to quite 
smoking, but you also crave another ciga-
rette. You are struggling to save money, but 
you are also tempted to buy a new comput-
er. Where is the freedom when one of these 
opposing desires inexplicably triumphs over 
its rival?28  
 
But no compatibilist has claimed (so far as 
I know) that our free will is absolute and trou-
ble‐free. On the contrary there is a sizable and 
fascinating literature on the importance of the 
various well‐known ways in which we respond 
to such looming cases of “weakness of will,” 
from which we all suffer. When one desire tri-
umphs, this is not usually utterly inexplicable, 
but rather the confirmable result of efforts of 
self‐manipulation and self‐education, based on 
empirical self‐exploration. We learn something 
about what makes us tick – not usually in neu-
roscientific terms, but rather in terms of folk 
psychology – and design a strategy to correct 
the blind spots we find, the biases we identify. 
That practice undeniably occurs, and undeni-
ably works to a certain extent. We can im-
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prove our self‐control, and this is a morally 
significant fact about the competence of nor-
mal adults – the only people whom we hold 
fully (but not “absolutely” or “deeply”) re-
sponsible. Remove the word “inexplicably” 
from exhibit A and the rhetorical question has 
a perfectly good answer: in many cases our 
freedom is an achievement, for which we are 
partly responsible. (Yes, luck plays a role but 
so does skill; we are not just lucky).29 
 
(B) The problem for compatibilism runs 
deeper, however – for where is the free-
dom in wanting what one wants without 
any internal conflict whatsoever?30  
 
To answer a rhetorical question with an-
other, so long as one can get what one wants 
so wholeheartedly, what could be better? 
What could be more freedom than that? Any 
realistic, reasonable account of free will 
acknowledges that we are stuck with some of 
our desires: for food and comfort and love 
and absence of pain – and the freedom to do 
what we want. We can’t not want these, or if 
we somehow succeed in getting ourselves in-
to such a sorry state, we are pathological. 
These are the healthy, normal, sound, wise 
desires on which all others must rest. So ban-
ish the fantasy of any account of free will that is 
screwed so tight it demands that we aren’t free 
unless all our desires and meta‐desires and me-
ta‐meta‐desires are optional, choosable. Such 
“perfect” freedom is, of course, an incoherent 
idea, and if Harris is arguing against it, he is not 
finding a “deep” problem with compatibilism 
but a shallow problem with his incompatibilist 
vision of free will; he has taken on a straw man, 
and the straw man is beating him. 
 
(C) Where is the freedom in being per-
fectly satisfied with your thoughts, inten-
tions, and subsequent actions when they 
are the product of prior events that you 
had absolutely no hand in creating?31 
 
Not only has he not shown that you had ab-
solutely no hand in creating those prior events, 
but it is false, as just noted. Once you stop 
thinking of free will as a magical metaphysical 
endowment and start thinking of it as an expli-
cable achievement that individual human be-
ings normally accomplish (very much aided by 
the societies in which they live), much as they 
learn to speak and read and write, this rhetori-
cal question falls flat. Infants don’t have free 
will; normal adults do. Yes, those of us who 
have free will are lucky to have free will (we’re 
lucky to be human beings, we’re lucky to be 
alive), but our free will is not just a given; it is 
something we are obliged to protect and nur-
ture, with help from our families and friends 
and the societies in which we live.  
Harris allows himself one more rhetorical 
question on page 19, and this one he emphat-
ically answers: 
 
(D) Am I free to do that which does not 
occur to me to do? Of course not.32  
 
Again, really? You’re playing bridge and try-
ing to decide whether or not to win the trick in 
front of you. You decide to play your ace, win-
ning the trick. Were you free to play a low card 
instead? It didn’t occur to you (it should have, 
but you acted rather thoughtlessly, as your 
partner soon informs you). Were you free to 
play your six instead? In some sense. We 
wouldn’t play games if there weren’t opportuni-
ties in them to make one choice or another. 
But, comes the familiar rejoinder, if determin-
ism is true and we rewound the tape of time 
and put you in exactly the same physical state, 
you’d ignore the six of clubs again. True, but so 
what? It does not show that you are not the 
agent you think you are. Contrast your compe-
tence at this moment with the “competence” of 
a robotic bridge‐playing doll that always plays 
its highest card in the suit, no matter what the 
circumstances. It wasn’t free to choose the six, 
because it would play the ace whatever the cir-
cumstances were whereas if it occurred to you to 
play the six, you could do it, depending on the 
circumstances. Freedom involves the ability to 
have one’s choices influenced by changes in the 
world that matter under the circumstances. 
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Not a perfect ability, but a reliable ability. If 
you are such a terrible bridge player that you 
can never see the virtue in ducking a trick, play-
ing less than the highest card in your hand, then 
your free will at the bridge table is seriously 
abridged: you are missing the opportunities 
that make bridge an interesting game. If de-
terminism is true, are these real opportunities? 
Yes, as real as an opportunity could be: thanks 
to your perceptual apparatus, your memory, 
and the well‐lit environment, you are caused/ 
determined to evaluate the situation as one that 
calls for playing the six, and you play the six. 
Turn to page 20 and get one more rhetor-
ical question:  
 
(E) And there is no way I can influence 
my desires – for what tools of influence 
would I use? Other desires?33  
 
Yes, for starters. Once again, Harris is ig-
noring a large and distinguished literature that 
defends this claim. We use the same tools to 
influence our own desires as we use to influ-
ence other people’s desires. I doubt that he 
denying that we ever influence other people’s 
desires. His book is apparently an attempt to 
influence the beliefs and desires of his readers, 
and it seems to have worked rather better 
than I would like. His book also seems to have 
influenced his own beliefs and desires: writing 
it has blinded him to alternatives that he really 
ought to have considered. So his obliviousness 
is something for which he himself is partly re-
sponsible, having labored to create a mindset 
that sees compatibilism as deliberately obtuse. 
When Harris turns to a consideration of 
my brand of compatibilism, he quotes at 
length from a nice summary of it by Tom 
Clark, notes that I have approved of that 
summary, and then says that it perfectly ar-
ticulates the difference between my view and 
his own. And this is his rebuttal:  
 
(F) As I have said, I think compatibilists like 
Dennett change the subject: They trade a 
psychological fact – the subjective experi-
ence of being a conscious agent – for a con-
ceptual understanding of ourselves as per-
sons. This is a bait and switch. The psycho-
logical truth is that people feel identical to a 
certain channel of information in their con-
scious minds. Dennett is simply asserting 
that we are more than this – we are coter-
minous with everything that goes on inside 
our bodies, whether we are conscious of it 
or not. This is like saying we are made of 
stardust – which we are. But we don’t feel 
like stardust. And the knowledge that we 
are stardust is not driving our moral intui-
tions or our system of criminal justice.34 
 
I have thought long and hard about this 
passage, and I am still not sure I understand it, 
since it seems to be at war with itself. Harris 
apparently thinks you see yourself as a con-
scious witness, perhaps immaterial – an im-
mortal soul, perhaps – that is distinct from 
(the rest of?) your brain. He seems to be say-
ing that this folk understanding people have 
of what they are identical to must be taken as a 
“psychological fact” that anchors any discus-
sion of free will. And then he notes that I 
claim that this folk understanding is just plain 
wrong and try to replace it with a more scien-
tifically sound version of what a conscious 
person is. Why is it “bait and switch” if I claim 
to improve on the folk version of personhood 
before showing how it allows for free will? He 
can’t have it both ways. He is certainly claim-
ing in his book that the dualism that is uncriti-
cally endorsed by many, maybe most, people is 
incoherent, and he is right – I’ve argued the 
same for decades. But then how can he object 
that I want to replace the folk conception of 
free will based on that nonsense with a better 
one? The fact that the folk don’t feel as if they 
are larger than their imagined Cartesian souls 
doesn’t count against my account, since I am 
proposing to correct the mistake manifest in 
that “psychological fact” (if it is one). And if 
Harris thinks that it is this folk notion of free 
will that “drives our moral intuitions and our 
legal system” he should tackle the large litera-
ture that says otherwise.35 
One more rhetorical question:   
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(G) How can we be “free” as conscious 
agents if everything that we consciously in-
tend is caused by events in our brain that we 
do not intend and of which we are entirely 
unaware? We can’t.36 
 
Let’s take this apart, separating its ele-
ments. First let’s try dropping the last clause: 
«of which we are entirely unaware». «How 
can we be “free” as conscious agents if every-
thing that we consciously intend is caused by 
events in our brain that we do not intend»? 
Well, if the events that cause your intentions 
are thoughts about what the best course of 
action probably is, and why it is the right 
thing to do, then that causation strikes me as 
the very epitome of freedom: you have the 
ability to intend exactly what you think to be 
the best course of action. When folks lack 
that ability, when they find they are unable to 
act intentionally on the courses of action they 
deem best, all things considered, we say they 
suffer from weakness of will. An intention that 
was an apparently causeless orphan, arising 
for no discernible reason, would hardly be 
seen as free; it would be viewed as a horrible 
interloper, as in alien hand syndrome, im-
posed on the agent from who knows where. 
Now let’s examine the other half of Har-
ris’s question: «How can we be “free” as con-
scious agents if everything that we conscious-
ly intend is caused by events in our brain of 
which we are entirely unaware?».37 I don’t 
always have to reflect, consciously, on my 
reasons for my intentions for them to be both 
mine and free. When I say “thank you” to 
somebody who gives me something, it is 
“force of habit” and I am entirely unaware of 
the events in my brain that cause me to say it 
but it is nonetheless a good example of a free 
action. Had I had a reason to override the 
habit, I would have overridden it. My not do-
ing so tacitly endorses it as an action of mine. 
Most of the intentions we frame are like this, 
to one degree or another: we “instinctively” 
reach out and pull the pedestrian to safety 
without time for thinking; we rashly adopt a 
sarcastic tone when replying to the police of-
ficer, we hear the doorbell and jump up to see 
who’s there. These are all voluntary actions 
for which we are normally held responsible if 
anything hinges on them. Harris notes that 
the voluntary/involuntary distinction is a 
valuable one, but doesn’t consider that it 
might be part of the foundation of our moral 
and legal understanding of free will. Why 
not? Because he is so intent on bashing a car-
icature doctrine.  
He ends his chapter on compatibilism 
with this: 
 
People feel that they are the authors of 
their thoughts and actions, and this is the 
only reason why there seems to be a prob-
lem of free will worth talking about.38 
 
I can agree with this, if I am allowed to 
make a small insertion:  
   
People feel that they are the authors of their 
thoughts and actions, and interpreted un-
charitably, their view can be made to appear 
absurd; taken the best way, however, they can 
be right; and this is the only reason why 
there seems to be a problem of free will 
worth talking about.  
   
One more puzzling assertion:  
 
Thoughts like “What should I get my 
daughter for her birthday? I know – I’ll 
take her to a pet store and have her pick 
out some tropical fish” convey the appar-
ent reality of choices, freely made. But 
from a deeper perspective (speaking both 
objectively and subjectively) thoughts 
simply arise unauthored and yet author 
our actions.39  
   
What would an authored thought look 
like, pray tell? And how can unauthored 
thoughts author our actions? Does Harris 
mean cause, shape and control our actions? But 
if an unauthored thought can cause, shape and 
control something, why can’t a whole person 
cause, shape and control something? Probably 
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this was misspeaking on Harris’s part. He 
should have said that unauthored thoughts 
are the causes, shapers and controllers – but 
not the authors – of our actions. Nothing 
could be an author, not really. But here again 
Harris is taking an everyday, folk notion of 
authorship and inflating it into metaphysical 
nonsense. If he can be the author of his book, 
then he can be the author of his thoughts. If 
he is not the author of Free Will, he should 
take his name off the cover, shouldn’t he? But 
he goes on immediately to say he is the cause 
of his book, and «If I had not decided to write 
this book, it wouldn’t have written itself».40 
 
Decisions, intentions, efforts, goals, will-
power, etc., are causal states of the brain, 
leading to specific behaviors, and behaviors 
lead to outcomes in the world. Human 
choice, therefore, is as important as fanciers 
of free will believe. But the next choice you 
make will come out of the darkness of prior 
causes that you, the conscious witness of 
your experience, did not bring into being.41  
 
We’ve already seen that the last sentence is 
false. But notice that if it were true, then it 
would be hard to see why “human choice is im-
portant” – except in the way lightning bolts are 
important (they can do a lot of damage). If 
your choices “come out of the darkness” and 
you did not bring them into being, then they 
are like the involuntary effusions of sufferers 
from Tourette’s Syndrome, who blurt out ob-
scenities and make gestures that are as baffling 
to them as to others. In fact, we know very well 
that I can influence your choices, and you can 
influence my choices, and even your own 
choices, and that this “bringing into being” of 
different choices is what makes them morally 
important. That’s why we exhort and chastise 
and instruct and praise and encourage and in-
form others and ourselves. 
Harris draws our attention to how hard it 
can be to change our bad habits, in spite of 
reading self‐help books and many self‐admo-
nitions. These experiences, he notes, «are not 
even slightly suggestive of freedom of the 
will».42  
True, but then other experiences we have 
are often very suggestive of free will. I make a 
promise, I solemnly resolve to keep it, and 
happily, I do! I hate grading essays, but recog-
nizing that my grades are due tomorrow, I re-
luctantly sit down and grind through them. I 
decide to drive to Boston and lo and behold, 
the next thing I know I’m behind the wheel of 
my car driving to Boston! If I could almost 
never do such things I would indeed doubt my 
own free will, and toy with the sad conclusion 
that somewhere along the way I had become a 
helpless victim of my lazy habits and no longer 
had free will. Entirely missing from Harris’s 
account – and it is not a lacuna that can be re-
paired – is any acknowledgment of the moral-
ly important difference between normal peo-
ple (like you and me and Harris, in all likeli-
hood) and people with serious deficiencies in 
self‐control. The reason he can’t include this 
missing element is that his whole case depends 
in the end on insisting that there really is no 
morally relevant difference between the rav-
ing psychopath and us. We have no more free 
will than he does. Well, we have more some-
thing than he does, and it is morally im-
portant. And it looks very much like what eve-
ryday folks often call free will. 
 
Of course you can create a framework in 
which certain decisions are more likely 
than others – you can, for instance, purge 
your house of all sweets, making it very 
unlikely that you will eat dessert later in 
the evening – but you cannot know why 
you were able to submit to such a frame-
work today when you weren’t yesterday.43 
 
Here he seems at first to be acknowledg-
ing the very thing I said was missing in his 
account above – the fact that you can take 
steps to bring about an alteration in your cir-
cumstances that makes a difference to your 
subsequent choices. But notice that his con-
cession is short‐lived, because he insists that 
you are just as in the dark about how your 
decision to purge your house of all sweets 
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came about. But that is, or may well be, false. 
You may know exactly what train of thought 
led you to that policy. But then, you can’t 
know why that train of thought occurred to 
you, and moved you then. No, you can, and 
often do. Maybe your candy‐banishing is the 
nth level result of your deciding to decide to 
decide to decide to decide […] to do some-
thing about your health. But since the regress 
is infinite, you can’t be responsible! Nonsense. 
You can’t be “ultimately responsible” (as Ga-
len Strawson has argued) but so what? You 
can be partially, largely responsible. 
I cannot resist ending this catalogue of 
mistakes with the one that I find most glaring: 
the cover of Harris’s little book, which shows 
marionette strings hanging down. The point, 
which he reiterates several times in the book, 
is that the prior causes (going back to the Big 
Bang, if you like) that determine your choices 
are like the puppeteer who determines the 
puppet’s every action, every “decision”. This 
analogy enables him to get off a zinger: 
«Compatibilism amounts to nothing more 
than an assertion of the following creed: A 
puppet is free as long as he loves his strings».44 
This is in no way supported by anything in 
his discussion of compatibilism. Somehow 
Harris has missed one of the deepest points 
made by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 
their introduction to their ground‐breaking 
1953 book, Theory of Games and Economic Be-
havior.45 Whereas Robinson Crusoe alone on 
his desert island can get by with probabilities 
and expected utility theory, as soon as there is 
a second agent to deal with, he needs to worry 
about feedback, secrecy and the intentions of 
the other agent or agents (what I have called 
intentional systems). For this he needs game 
theory. There is a fundamental difference be-
tween an environment with no competing 
agents and an environment populated with 
would‐be manipulators.46 The manifold of 
causes that determine our choices only inter-
mittently includes other agents, and when 
they are around they do indeed represent a 
challenge to our free will, since they may well 
try to read our minds and covertly influence 
our beliefs, but the environment in general is 
not such an agent, and hence is no puppeteer. 
When sunlight bouncing off a ripe apple caus-
es me to decide to reach up and pick it off the 
tree, I am not being controlled by that master 
puppeteer, Captain Worldaroundme. I am 
controlling myself, thanks to the information I 
garner from the world around me. Please, 
Sam, don’t feed the bugbears.47 
Harris half recognizes this when later in 
the book he raises puppets one more time: 
 
It is one thing to bicker with your wife be-
cause you are in a bad mood; it is another to 
realize that your mood and behavior have 
been caused by low blood sugar. This un-
derstanding reveals you to be a biochemical 
puppet, of course, but it also allows you to 
grab hold of one of your strings. A bite of 
food may be all that your personality re-
quires. Getting behind our conscious 
thoughts and feelings can allow us to steer a 
more intelligent course through our lives 
(while knowing, of course, that we are ulti-
mately being steered).48 
 
So unlike the grumpy child (or moody 
bear), we intelligent human adults can «grab 
hold of one of our strings». But then if our 
bodies are the puppets and we are the pup-
peteers, we can control our bodies, and 
thereby our choices, and hence can be held 
responsible – really but not Ultimately re-
sponsible – for our actions and our charac-
ters. We are not immaterial souls but embod-
ied rational agents, determined (in two sens-
es) to do what is right, most of the time, and 
ready to be held responsible for our deeds. 
Harris, like the other scientists who have re-
cently mounted a campaign to convince the 
world that free will is an illusion, has a laudable 
motive: to launder the ancient stain of Sin and 
Guilt out of our culture, and abolish the cruel 
and all too usual punishments that we zestfully 
mete out to the Guilty. As they point out, our 
zealous search for “justice” is often little more 
than our instinctual yearning for retaliation 
dressed up to look respectable. The result, es-
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pecially in the United States, is a barbaric sys-
tem of imprisonment – to say nothing of capi-
tal punishment – that should make all citizens 
ashamed. By all means, let’s join hands and re-
form the legal system, reduce its excesses and 
restore a measure of dignity – and freedom! – 
to those whom the state must punish. But the 
idea that all punishment is, in the end, unjusti-
fiable and should be abolished because nobody 
is ever really responsible, because nobody has 
“real” free will is not only not supported by sci-
ence or philosophical argument; it is blind to 
the chilling lessons of the not so distant past. 
Do we want to medicalize all violators of the 
laws, giving them indefinitely large amounts of 
involuntary “therapy” in “asylums” (the poor 
dears, they aren’t responsible, but for the good 
of the society we have to institutionalize them)? 
I hope not. But then we need to recognize the 
powerful (consequentialist) arguments for 
maintaining a system of punishment (and re-
ward).49 Punishment can be fair, punishment 
can be justified, and in fact, our societies could 
not manage without it. 
This discussion of punishment versus 
medicalization may seem irrelevant to Har-
ris’s book, and an unfair criticism, since he 
himself barely alludes to it, and offers no 
analysis of its possible justification, but that 
is a problem for him. He blandly concedes we 
will – and should – go on holding some peo-
ple responsible but then neglects to say what 
that involves. Punishment and reward? If 
not, what does he mean? If so, how does he 
propose to regulate and justify it? I submit 
that if he had attempted to address these 
questions he would have ended up with 
something like this: Those eligible for pun-
ishment and reward are those with the gen-
eral abilities to respond to reasons (warnings, 
threats, promises) rationally. Real differences 
in these abilities are empirically discernible, 
explicable, and morally relevant. Such abili-
ties can arise and persist in a deterministic 
world, and they are the basis for a justifiable 
policy of reward and punishment, which 
brings society many benefits – indeed makes 
society possible. (Those who lack one or an-
other of the abilities that constitute this mor-
al competence are often said, by everyday 
folk, to lack free will, and this fact is the heart 
of compatibilism.) 
If you think that the fact that incompatibil-
ist free will is an illusion demonstrates that no 
punishment can ever be truly deserved, think 
again. It may help to consider all these issues 
in the context of a simpler phenomenon: 
sports. In basketball there is the distinction 
between ordinary fouls and flagrant fouls, and 
in soccer there is the distinction between yel-
low cards and red cards, to list just two exam-
ples. Are these distinctions fair? Justified? 
Should Harris be encouraged to argue that 
there is no real difference between the dirty 
player and the rest (and besides, the dirty 
player isn’t responsible for being a dirty play-
er; just look at his upbringing!)? Everybody 
who plays games must recognize that games 
without strictly enforced rules are not worth 
playing, and the rules that work best do not 
make allowances for differences in heritage, 
training, or innate skill. So it is in society gen-
erally: we are all considered equal under the 
law, presumed to be responsible until and un-
less we prove to have some definite defect or 
infirmity that robs us of our free will, as ordi-
narily understood. 
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